In Re: Avandia Marketing by unknown
2015 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
10-26-2015 
In Re: Avandia Marketing 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015 
Recommended Citation 
"In Re: Avandia Marketing" (2015). 2015 Decisions. 1125. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015/1125 
This October is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2015 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
  
      PRECEDENTIAL  
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
   
No. 14-1948 
____________ 
 
IN RE: AVANDIA MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES &  
PRODUCT LIABILITY LITIGATION 
   
GlaxoSmithKline, LLC, 
         
                                                    Appellant 
       
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D. C. Nos. 2-09-cv-00730, 2-10-cv-02475, 
 2-10-cv-05419, 2-07-md-01871) 
District Judge:  Honorable Cynthia M. Rufe 
       
 
Argued on November 18, 2014 
 
Before:  AMBRO, SCIRICA and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  October 26, 2015) 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
John H. Beisner, Esquire   (Argued)  
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom 
1440 New York Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20005 
 
Nina M. Gussack, Esquire 
Anthony C. Vale, Esquire 
Pepper & Hamilton 
18th & Arch Streets 
3000 Two Logan Square 
Philadelphia, PA 19103 
   Counsel for Appellant 
 
 
Samuel Issacharoff, Esquire   (Argued) 
New York University Law School 
Room 411J 
40 Washington Square South 
New York, NY 10012 
 
James R. Dugan, II, Esquire 
David B. Franco, Esquire 
Douglas R. Plymale, Esquire 
The Dugan Law Firm 
365 Canal Street 
Suite 1000 
New Orleans, LA 70130 
 
Arnold Levin, Esquire 
Frederick S. Longer, Esquire 
Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman 
510 Walnut Street 
Suite 500 
 3 
 
Philadelphia, PA 19106 
 
   Counsel for Appellees Allied Services  
   Division Welfare Fund and UFCW Local 
   1776 and Participating Employees  
   Health and Welfare Fund 
 
Tracy D. Rezvani, Esquire   
Rezvani Volin & Rotbert 
1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. 
10th Floor 
Washington, DC 20036 
 
   Counsel for Appellee United  
   Benefit Fund 
 
Charles H. Moellenberg, Jr., Esq. 
Jones Day 
500 Grant Street 
Suite 4500 
Pittsburgh, PA 15219 
 
   Counsel for Amicus Appellant Product  
   Liability Advisory Council 
 
Peter D. St. Phillip, Jr., Esq. 
Lowey, Dannenberg, Cohen & Hart 
One North Broadway 
Suite 509 
White Plains, NY 10601 
 
   Counsel for Amicus Appellees Aetna  
   Inc, Louisiana Health Service Indemnity  
 4 
 
   Co, Premera Blue Cross, Caring for  
   Montanans Inc, Blue Cross & Blue  
   Shield of Minnesota, CareFirst of   
   Maryland Inc, Cambia Health Solutions,  
   Highmark Inc, EmblemHealth Services  
   Co LLC, Group Health Cooperative,  
   Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Rhode  
   Island, Noridian Mutual Insurance Co,  
   Health Net Inc, Government Employees  
   Health Association, Blue Cross & Blue  
   Shield of Florida, Blue Cross & Blue  
   Shield of North Carolina, Wellpoint Inc,  
   Blue Cross & Blue Shield of South  
   Carolina, Blue Cross & Blue Shield of  
   Massachusetts and AvMed Health Plans 
 
Robert N. Weiner, Esq. 
Arnold & Porter 
601 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20001 
 
   Counsel for Amicus Appellee   
   Pharmaceuticals Research and   
   Manufacturers of America 
 
   
 
O P I N I O N  
   
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
 5 
 
This interlocutory appeal involves claims brought 
against GlaxoSmithKline LLC (GSK) by third-party payors 
(TPPs), based on GSK’s alleged misrepresentation and 
concealment of the significant safety risks associated with use 
of Avandia, Avandamet, and Avandaryl (collectively, 
Avandia), Type II diabetes drugs.  GSK argues that the 
District Court erred in finding that the TPPs adequately 
alleged the elements of standing under the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).1  We 
agree with the District Court’s analysis, finding standing, and 
therefore we will affirm.  
 
I. 
A.2 
Plaintiffs, Allied Services Division Welfare Fund, 
UFCW Local 1776 and Participating Employers Health and 
Welfare Fund, and United Benefit Fund, are TPPs.  They are 
union health and welfare funds and are suing GSK on behalf 
of themselves and other similarly situated TPPs.  TPPs 
typically provide medical coverage, including prescription 
drug coverage, to their members and members’ dependents.  
  
                                              
1 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.  
2 These facts are taken from the Complaints and treated as 
true because, in reviewing a denial of a motion pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), we accept as true 
all well-pleaded allegations and construe the complaint in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiffs.  See Lewis v. Atlas Van 
Lines, Inc., 542 F.3d 403, 405 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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Whether a TPP will cover the cost of a member’s 
prescription, in whole or in part, depends on whether that 
drug is listed in the TPP’s “formulary.”  Pharmacy Benefit 
Managers (PBMs) prepare TPPs’ formularies of drugs 
approved for use by the TPPs’ members.  The formularies are 
prepared by analyzing research regarding a drug’s cost 
effectiveness, safety and efficacy.  When a PBM determines 
that a drug offers advantages over a competing drug, it will 
give that drug preferred status on the formulary.  A TPP will 
typically cover more of the cost of a particular drug when that 
drug has a higher preference status on the formulary.  The 
greater coverage of cost by the TPP allows the member to pay 
a lower co-payment when prescribed that drug. 
 
 Type II diabetes is the most common form of diabetes 
and results from the body’s failure to produce enough insulin 
or its inability to properly use insulin.  Type II diabetes was 
first treated with oral medications, primarily metformin and 
sulfonylureas, or with injected insulin.  In the 1990s, 
pharmaceutical companies began to develop a new form of 
Type II diabetes treatment known as thiazolidinediones 
(TZDs).  On May 25, 1999, the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) approved Avandia, a TZD, for sale in 
the United States.  GSK marketed Avandia as a more 
effective and safer alternative to the cheaper, existing Type II 
oral medications.  In turn, TPPs included Avandia in their 
formularies and covered Avandia prescriptions at a favorable 
rate.   
 
 Soon after the FDA approved Avandia, concerns 
regarding its heart-related side effects began to surface.  For 
example, in 2001, the FDA requested that GSK add a warning 
to the prescription label regarding the increased risk of fluid 
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retention resulting from Avandia use.  Shortly thereafter, 
GSK’s sales representatives denied the existence of this risk.  
As a result, the FDA instructed GSK to stop minimizing the 
risk of heart attacks and heart-related diseases in its 
marketing.  In 2006, the FDA required GSK to update the 
warning to include new data about the potential increased 
occurrence of heart attack and heart-related chest pain in 
some Avandia patients.   
 In May 2007, Steven E. Nissen and Kathy Wolski 
published a paper in The New England Journal of Medicine, 
documenting the results of forty-two clinical trials of 
Avandia.  The Nissen study concluded that, compared with 
the use of competing diabetes drugs, Avandia use was 
associated with a significant increase in the risk of myocardial 
infarction and a borderline-significant increase in the risk of 
death from heart-related diseases.  According to the TPPs, 
GSK responded to the Nissen study with a marketing 
campaign designed to sway doctors and consumer 
confidence.  This campaign included publishing full-page 
advertisements in more than a dozen newspapers and the 
release of promotional materials to prescribing physicians.  
Specifically, GSK challenged the Nissen study’s 
methodology and conclusions and described the results of its 
own favorable study.   
 
 On May 23, 2007, the FDA recommended that GSK 
add a “black box” warning to Avandia’s label to warn of the 
risk of congestive heart failure in connection with the use of 
Avandia.  On August 14, 2007, GSK added the warning, 
which stated that TZDs “cause or exacerbate congestive heart 
failure in some patients. . . . Avandia is not recommended in 
patients with symptomatic heart failure.”  Three months later, 
the FDA added a second black box warning, describing the 
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Nissen study’s results as showing “Avandia to be associated 
with an increased risk of myocardial ischemic events such as 
angina or myocardial infarction.”   
 
 In February 2010, the U.S. Senate Finance Committee 
released a report on Avandia.  The Committee concluded that 
the “totality of the evidence suggests that GSK was aware of 
the possible cardiac risks associated with Avandia years 
before such evidence became public” and that GSK failed to 
notify the FDA and the public of these risks despite its duty to 
do so.  The report also noted that GSK attempted to minimize 
or misrepresent those risks in order to contradict the Nissen 
study and to intimidate independent physicians.   
 
 Ultimately, on September 23, 2010, the FDA restricted 
access to Avandia in response to increasing evidence of its 
cardiovascular risks.  Specifically, the FDA limited access to 
existing users and to new patients whose blood sugar could 
not be controlled with other medications and who had decided 
with their doctor not to take Actos, a competing TZD drug.  
Doctors were required to advise existing Avandia users of 
Avandia’s cardiovascular risks before continuing to prescribe 
it.      
 
 Since its release, Avandia has been used on a regular 
basis by at least one million individuals in the United States 
and has generated billions of dollars in revenue for GSK.  A 
one-month supply of Avandia has sold for $90 to $220, with 
the TPP covering between $135 and $140 per prescription 
and the patient paying the balance.  This was a dramatic 
increase in the cost of Type II diabetes treatment.  Previously, 
the most prevalent oral drug therapy, metformin, cost 
approximately $45 to $55 for a one-month supply, with the 
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TPP covering $40 to $50 of that amount.  Although plaintiffs 
identify Actos as another alternative to Avandia, they do not 
provide the price which TPPs typically covered for Actos 
prescriptions.   
 
B. 
 Plaintiffs bring this class action on behalf of 
themselves and other similarly situated TPPs that covered the 
cost of Avandia after May 25, 1999.  They assert that GSK’s 
failure to disclose Avandia’s significant heart-related risks 
violated RICO based on predicate acts of mail fraud,3 wire 
fraud,4 tampering with witnesses,5 and use of interstate 
facilities to conduct unlawful activity.6  They also assert 
claims for unjust enrichment and violations of the 
Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer 
Protection Law7 and other states’ consumer protection laws.   
 
 Plaintiffs allege that GSK deliberately concealed the 
significant safety risks associated with the use of Avandia and 
continued to promote Avandia as a safer treatment for 
diabetes despite the known risks of heart attack and disease.  
Specifically, plaintiffs allege that GSK selectively 
manipulated data and scientific literature, made false and 
misleading statements in its 2007 advertising campaign, and 
intimidated physicians to publish false and misleading 
articles—all in order to increase Avandia sales.  According to 
                                              
3 See 18 U.S.C. § 1341. 
4 See id. § 1343. 
5 See id. § 1512. 
6 See id. § 1952. 
7 See 73 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 201-1-201-9.3. 
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plaintiffs, TPPs and PBMs included Avandia in their 
formularies and covered Avandia at favorable rates in 
reliance on these misrepresentations by GSK.  Plaintiffs  
allege that Avandia was worth less than the favorable rates at 
which they covered it (their “excess price” theory).  Similarly, 
they allege that physicians relied on GSK’s 
misrepresentations in deciding to prescribe Avandia and 
would have prescribed Avandia to fewer patients had GSK 
not concealed Avandia’s risks (their “quantity effect” theory).  
Plaintiffs seek compensatory, punitive, and statutory damages 
for the financial harm they suffered as a result of GSK’s 
conduct, and they seek injunctive relief to prevent GSK from 
continuing its allegedly unlawful activities.   
 
  On November 3, 2010, GSK moved to dismiss, in 
part, because plaintiffs failed to adequately allege standing 
under Section 1964(c) of RICO.  The District Court rejected 
GSK’s arguments, holding that plaintiffs plausibly alleged 
that they had suffered a concrete economic injury based on 
the substantial savings they would have experienced had they 
covered cheaper alternatives to Avandia.  This was true 
regardless of whether any beneficiary who had ingested 
Avandia became ill.     
 
 The District Court also rejected GSK’s argument that 
plaintiffs failed to adequately allege proximate causation.  
According to the District Court, it is sufficient that plaintiffs 
alleged that doctors relied upon GSK’s misrepresentations in 
prescribing Avandia and that the TPPs themselves relied upon 
those misrepresentations in making formulary decisions.  The 
District Court noted, however, that plaintiffs may have 
difficulty in proving causation at the next litigation stage 
because they did not restrict access to Avandia after the 
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Nissen study publicized Avandia’s heart-related risks.  The 
District Court also rejected GSK’s argument that prescribing 
doctors’ independent actions broke the chain of causation.  
The District Court relied on In re Neurontin Marketing and 
Sales Practices Litigation,8 in which the First Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that, where a TPP is a primary and intended 
victim and the injury is foreseeable, the doctor’s independent 
actions do not break the causal chain.9 
 
 On February 19, 2014, the District Court certified its 
decision for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).  
The certified questions are the following:   
 
1)  Did the Court err in its application of Maio 
v. AETNA, Inc. 10 
 
2)  Did the TPPs sufficiently plead that 
Defendant’s alleged misrepresentation about 
Avandia’s safety caused their injuries, when the 
TPPs continued to include Avandia on their 
formularies and cover the cost of Avandia for 
                                              
8 712 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2013). 
9 The District Court also made a number of other findings, 
including that plaintiffs failed to adequately allege a claim for 
unjust enrichment.  Because plaintiffs did not allege that 
Avandia injured their beneficiaries or failed to perform as 
advertised, the District Court held that they “received the 
benefit of their bargains” and therefore could not maintain a 
claim for unjust enrichment.  This holding is not currently on 
appeal.   
10 221 F.3d 472 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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their members after the alleged cardiovascular 
risks of Avandia were well-publicized, and  
 
3)  Does the independent judgment of doctors 
and decision-making of the physicians who 
wrote the prescriptions for Avandia render the 
causal chain too attenuated to state a claim?11 
 
We granted permission to appeal on April 15, 2014. 
 
II.12 
 
 We exercise plenary review over a district court’s 
denial of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).13  “A motion to 
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) may be granted only if, 
accepting all well pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, 
and viewing them in the light most favorable to plaintiff, 
plaintiff is not entitled to relief.”14  The facts alleged in the 
complaint must state a “plausible claim for relief.”15  “The 
issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but 
                                              
11 We do not address plaintiffs’ state-law claims in this appeal 
because they are not explicitly addressed within the questions 
that have been certified to us. 
12 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1331.  We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1292(b). 
13 See Farber v. City of Paterson, 440 F.3d 131, 134 (3d Cir. 
2006).   
14 In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 
1420 (3d Cir. 1997).   
15 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 
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whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support 
the claims.”16  We also exercise plenary review over a district 
court’s legal determination that plaintiffs have standing to 
pursue a civil RICO action.17 
 
III.  
 The issue on appeal is whether plaintiffs have 
adequately pled standing to pursue a civil action under 
Section 1964(c) of RICO.  Section 1964(c) provides that: 
 
Any person injured in his business or property 
by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this 
chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate 
United States district court and shall recover 
threefold the damages he sustains and the cost 
of the suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee 
. . ..18   
                                              
16 Maio, 221 F.3d at 482 (quoting In re Burlington, 114 F.3d 
at 1420).   
17 See id.    
18 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).  Section 1962 prohibits, in part, “any 
person employed by or associated with any enterprise 
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or 
foreign commerce” from “conduct[ing] or participat[ing], 
directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s 
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.”  Id. § 
1962(c).  A “racketeering activity” can consist of a variety of 
predicate offenses, including, as alleged in this case, mail 
fraud, wire fraud, tampering with witnesses, and use of 
interstate facilities to conduct unlawful activity, see id. § 
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The language of § 1964(c) requires a RICO plaintiff to show 
that the plaintiff suffered an injury to business or property and 
that the plaintiff’s injury was caused by the defendant’s 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962.19  Section 1964(c)’s “limitation 
of RICO standing to persons ‘injured in [their] business or 
property’ has a ‘restrictive significance, which helps to assure 
that RICO is not expanded to provide a federal cause of 
action and treble damages to every tort plaintiff.’” 20   
 
A. 
 We must first determine whether plaintiffs adequately 
alleged injury to business or property within the meaning of 
RICO.  “‘[A] showing of injury requires proof of a concrete 
financial loss, and not mere injury to a valuable intangible 
property interest.’”21  This requirement “can be satisfied by 
allegations and proof of actual monetary loss, i.e., an out-of-
pocket loss.”22   
 
 GSK claims that the TPPs fail to assert a concrete 
injury, citing our decision in Maio.  In that case, we 
considered whether health insurance beneficiaries could 
maintain a RICO claim for economic injury against their 
                                                                                                     
1961(1), and a “pattern” of such activity requires at least two 
acts, id. § 1961(5). 
19 See Maio, 221 F.3d at 483.   
20 Maio, 221 F.3d at 483 (quoting Steele v. Hospital Corp. of 
Am., 36 F.3d 69, 70 (9th Cir. 1994)) (internal citation 
omitted). 
21 Id. (quoting Steele, 36 F.3d at 70). 
22 Id.  
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insurer, Aetna, based on alleged misrepresentations regarding 
the services included in their HMO plans.23  The insured 
parties claimed that the insurer’s failure to disclose restrictive 
internal policies caused them injury by causing them to “pa[y] 
too much in premiums for an ‘inferior’ health care product.”24  
They alleged that the internal policies were designed to 
improve profitability at the expense of quality of care, 
whereas the insurer’s marketing campaign represented that 
the purchased policy focused on quality of care.25  The 
insured parties also claimed that the internal policies 
“restrict[ed] the physicians’ ability to provide the high quality 
health care . . . promised.”26 
 
 We rejected the plaintiffs’ claims, finding that the 
insured parties suffered no cognizable injury.  We construed 
the insured parties’ property interests as the intangible 
“contractual right to receive benefits in the form of covered 
medical services,” and found that the insured parties had 
suffered no injury absent allegations that they had received 
“inadequate, inferior delayed care, personal injuries resulting 
therefrom, or [the] denial of benefits due under the insurance 
arrangement.27  Because the insured parties specifically 
disclaimed any contractual shortcoming on the part of the 
insurer, they “simply c[ould not] establish as a factual matter 
that they received anything less than what they bargained 
for.”28  Instead, the alleged economic harm was “contingent 
                                              
23 See id. at 483-84. 
24 Id. at 484-85. 
25 Id. at 474. 
26 Id. at 475. 
27 Id. at 490. 
28 Id. at 494. 
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upon the impact of events in the future” – namely, inadequate 
care produced by the insurer’s internal policies.29  We 
concluded that plaintiffs could not establish that they had 
suffered a tangible economic harm because their theory of 
injury was premised solely on the possibility that they might 
receive inadequate healthcare in the future.30 
 
 GSK argues that here too, the TPPs’ injury is 
predicated on the possibility that future events might occur – 
namely, that the drugs purchased by the TPPs will prove to be 
unsafe or ineffective.  However, because the TPPs do not 
allege that they received unsafe or ineffective prescriptions, 
GSK argues that they have received exactly what they 
bargained for and that they have not suffered a concrete 
injury. 
 
 The TPPs respond that their injury is one which has 
long been considered concrete:  overpayment due to illegal or 
deceptive marketing practices.  They cite our decision in In re 
Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litigation,31 in which TPPs 
alleged that DuPont violated antitrust law by disseminating 
false and misleading information about a cheaper generic 
drug, causing the TPPs to cover the cost of duPont’s more 
expensive brand name drug.32  We held that “TPPs, like 
                                              
29 Id. at 494-95. 
30 Id. at 495. 
31 391F.3d 516 (3d Cir. 2004). 
32 Although Warfarin was an antitrust case, it is applicable 
here because RICO’s standing requirements were modeled on 
antitrust law.  In drafting Section 1964(c), Congress “used the 
same words [as § 7 of the Sherman Act and § 4 of the Clayton 
Act], and we can only assume it intended them to have the 
 17 
 
individual consumers, suffer[] direct economic harm when, as 
a result of [a pharmaceutical company’s] alleged 
misrepresentations, they pa[y] supracompetitive prices for 
[brand drugs] instead of purchasing lower-priced generic 
[drugs].”33  According to the TPPs, if allegedly 
anticompetitive behavior that leads to overpayment 
establishes a concrete injury, then so should allegedly 
fraudulent behaviorthat leads to overpayment. 
 
 We agree with the TPPs that Warfarin offers the 
closest analogy to the facts of this case and that GSK’s 
reliance on Maio is distinguishable in one crucial respect:  
unlike the injury suffered by plaintiffs in Maio, the injury 
suffered by the TPPs here is not contingent on future events.  
The TPPs’ damages do not depend on the effectiveness of the 
Avandia that they purchased, but rather on the inflationary 
effect that GSK’s allegedly fraudulent behavior had on the 
price of Avandia.  By contrast, the damages suffered by the 
plaintiffs in Maio were entirely dependent on the quality of 
the health care they received.  Because the plaintiffs in that 
case did not allege that they had received inadequate care, 
their “theory of present economic loss require[d] a significant 
degree of factual speculation,”34 and was thus insufficient to 
establish standing. 
 
                                                                                                     
same meaning that courts had already given them.”  See 
Holmes, 503 U.S. at 266-68; see  also Steamfitters Local 
Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 
912, 921, 932 (3d Cir. 1999). 
33 Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 531. 
34 Maio, 221 F.3d at 495. 
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 To further illustrate the point, suppose that the 
defendants in Warfarin had asserted that the TPPS had failed 
to establish standing because they had not alleged that the 
drugs they had purchased were ineffective.  That argument 
would have been rejected by the court:  the injury suffered by 
the TPPs in that case did not depend on the drug’s 
ineffectiveness but rather on the defendant’s anticompetitive 
behavior.  That same logic would apply here.  The injury 
suffered by the TPPs in this case does not depend on 
Avandia’s ineffectiveness, but rather on GSK’s fraudulent 
behavior.  As such, the TPPs’ theory of economic loss does 
not require factual speculation.  If we accept the plausible 
allegations in the complaint as true, the fraudulent behavior 
alleged in their complaint has already occurred, and its effect 
on the price of Avandia is not contingent on future events.  
 
 Reliance on our decisions in In re Schering-Plough 
Corp. Intron/Temodar Consumer Class Action,35 and Horvath 
v. Keystone Health Plan East, Inc.,36 is similarly misplaced.  
In Schering-Plough, TPPs alleged that Schering’s off-label 
promotional activities of certain drugs caused them economic 
injury.  Relying on Maio, the District Court held that the 
plaintiffs lacked standing to assert this injury because they 
failed to allege that any consumers or beneficiaries received 
inadequate drugs or suffered personal injuries.37  On appeal, 
we affirmed the District Court on causation grounds.  To the 
                                              
35 678 F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 2012). 
36 333 F.3d 450 (3d Cir. 2003). 
37 See No. 2:06-cv-5774, 2009 WL 2043605, at *16 (D.N.J. 
July 10, 2009). 
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extent we agreed with the District Court’s injury analysis in 
that case, we did so in dictum, not in binding precedent.38 
 
 Horvath, an ERISA case, is distinguishable on the 
same basis as Maio.  In Horvath, as in Maio, the plaintiff 
alleged that she overpaid for the healthcare provided by an 
HMO due to the HMO’s misleading statements.39  But the 
plaintiff “d[id] not allege . . . that the care she received from 
the Keystone HMO was defective or substandard in any 
way.”40  Accordingly, we noted that the plaintiff’’s claims 
“rest not only on the troublesome assumption that a factfinder 
can accurately determine the amount her [employer] allegedly 
overpaid [the HMO], but also on the notion that the 
[employer] would have passed these savings on to its 
employees in the form of a higher salary or additional 
benefits.41  We determined that such a claim was too 
speculative to establish standing.42  In this case, however, if 
we accept the TPPs’ plausible allegations as true – as we are 
required to do at this stage – then no speculation is required to 
determine whether they suffered an injury. 
 
 GSK advances one final argument for its position that 
the TPPs have not suffered a concrete injury.  Relying on the 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Ironworkers 
Local Union 68 v. AstraZeneca Pharm., LP., 43 GSK argues 
that TPPs can statistically anticipate a certain level of fraud 
                                              
38 See Schering-Plough, 678 F.3d at 246. 
39 Horvath, 333 F.3d at 452. 
40 Id. at 453. 
41 Id. at 457. 
42 Id. 
43 634 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 2011). 
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and pass this risk on to their beneficiaries in the form of 
higher premiums.  In Ironworkers, a case with facts similar to 
these, the court found the plaintiff insurance companies 
suffered no injury because they “adjust[] their premiums 
upward to reflect the projected value of claims” for payment 
of “medically unnecessary or inappropriate prescriptions of 
formulary drugs” – “even those caused by fraudulent 
marketing.44  Although GSK says that the TPPs “presumably” 
adjusted their premiums in this way, we are not entitled to 
make such a presumption at the motion-to-dismiss stage.  
Furthermore, the argument lacks a limiting principle.45  
      
 B. 
 In addition to cognizable injury, a RICO plaintiff must 
satisfy RICO’s proximate causation requirements.  In 
evaluating the requirement for proximate cause in a RICO 
case, we cannot look only to the language of § 1964(c).  It is 
too broad:  “Any person injured in his business or property by 
reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter . . . shall 
recover . . ..”  The Supreme Court has been concerned about 
this breadth of language, which on its face might “be read to 
mean that a plaintiff is injured ‘by reason of’ a RICO 
violation, and therefore may recover, simply on showing that 
the defendant violated § 1962, the plaintiff was injured, and 
                                              
44 Id. at 1364, 1368. 
45 Were it “[t]aken to its ultimate conclusion  . . a retailer 
would be unable to claim injury from shoplifting, or a bank 
from robbery, on the ground that their business models 
presumably accounted for such losses in pricing their 
products and services.”  Br. Amicus Curiae Third Party 
Payors at 10.   
 21 
 
the defendant’s violation was a ‘but for’ cause of plaintiff’s 
injury.”46   
 The Court addressed this overbreadth concern in 
Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp.47  Noting that 
Congress had modeled the broad language of § 1964(c) on the 
language of the federal antitrust laws, the Court pointed out 
that historically the lower federal courts had read § 4 of the 
Clayton Act with the intent of adopting “the judicial gloss 
that avoided a simple literal interpretation . . ..”48  Thus, the 
Court had held in the antitrust case of Associated General 
Contractors that “the judicial remedy cannot encompass 
every conceivable harm that can be traced to alleged 
wrongdoing.”49 
 
 The Holmes Court found the remedy for this 
overbreadth in the doctrine of “proximate cause.”  The Court 
specified that “we use ‘proximate cause’ to label generically 
the judicial tools used to limit a person’s responsibility for the 
consequences of that person’s acts.”50  Because of the 
common language of § 1964(c) and of § 4 of the Clayton Act, 
the Court in Holmes then discussed the elements of proximate 
cause developed in the common law and, in doing so, referred 
                                              
46 Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 
258, 265-66 (1992) (comparing Associated General 
Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of 
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519,  529 (1983). 
47 503 U.S. 258 (1992). 
48 Id. at 267-68 (quoting Associated General Contractors, 459 
U.S. at 534.  
49 Associated General Contractors, 459 U.S. at 537. 
50 Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268. 
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to Associated General Contractors.51  Among the “many 
shapes” that the doctrine of proximate cause took at common 
law “was a demand for some direct relation between the 
injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.  Thus, a 
plaintiff who complained of harm flowing merely from the 
misfortunes visited upon a third person by the defendant’s 
acts was generally said to stand at too remote a distance to 
recover.”52   
 
 The Holmes Court stated that there are three reasons 
behind the requirement of a directness of relationship 
between the injury and conduct alleged.  First, the directness 
of the injury:  indirect injuries make it difficult “to ascertain 
the amount of a plaintiff’s damages attributable to the 
violation, as distinct from other, independent factors.”53  
Second, the risk of multiple recoveries:  indirect injuries may 
present such a risk and courts would have to adopt 
complicated rules apportioning damages to guard against this 
risk.54  Third, the likelihood of vindication by others:  the 
need to grapple with the problems presented by indirect 
claims may be unjustified “since directly injured victims can 
generally be counted on to vindicate the law as private 
attorneys general.”55 
 
 In Holmes, the Court concluded that the Securities 
Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) had failed to satisfy 
                                              
51 459 U.S. 519. 
52 Holmes at 268-69 (citing 1 J. Sutherland, Law of Damages 
55-56 (1882)). 
53 Id. at 269. 
54 Id.  
55 Id. at 269-70. 
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the proximate cause requirement.56  The SIPC, as a subrogee, 
alleged that the defendant engaged in a stock manipulation 
scheme, which caused two broker-dealers to become 
insolvent and, in turn, required that the SIPC reimburse the 
broker-dealers’ customers’ losses.57  The Supreme Court held 
that, even if plaintiffs stood in the shoes of the customers, 
“the link is too remote between the stock manipulation 
alleged and the customers’ harm, being purely contingent on 
the harm suffered by the broker-dealers.”58   
 
 Since Holmes, the Court has found proximate cause 
lacking in RICO cases when the conduct directly causing the 
harm was distinct from the actions that gave rise to the fraud.  
In Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp.,59 plaintiff alleged that a 
competing business caused it harm by defrauding the State 
tax authority and using the proceeds to offer lower prices to 
attract more customers.60  The Court held that the cause of 
plaintiff’s harm was “a set of actions (offering lower prices) 
entirely distinct from the alleged RICO violation (defrauding 
the State.).”61  A plurality of the justices reached a similar 
decision in Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New York,62 where 
New York City alleged that out-of-state cigarette sellers 
failed to file Jenkins Act reports with the State, and asserted 
injury in the form of lost taxes from City residents.63  The 
                                              
56 See id. at 261-63.   
57 See id.  
58 Id. at 271.   
59 547 U.S. 451 (2006).   
60 Id. at 457-58.   
61 Id. at 458. 
62 559 U.S. 1 (2010). 
63 Id. at 4-5.   
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plurality concluded that causation was even more attenuated 
than in Anza because “the City’s theory of liability rest[ed] 
not just on separate actions, but separate actions carried out 
by separate parties.”64  “Put simply, Hemi’s obligation was to 
file the Jenkins Act reports with the State, not the City, and 
the City’s harm was directly caused by the customers, not 
Hemi.”65 
 
 In contrast, however, if there is a sufficiently direct 
relationship between the defendant’s wrongful conduct and 
the plaintiffs’ injury, the Court has held that a RICO plaintiff 
who did not directly rely on a defendant’s misrepresentation 
can still establish proximate causation.66  In Bridge v. Phoenix 
Bond & Indemnity Co., bidders at a county tax lien auction 
alleged that they were directly harmed by other bidders’ 
fraudulent scheme to win more bids at the auction.67  The 
defendants argued that the plaintiffs could not establish 
proximate causation because even though the county may 
have relied on defendants’ misrepresentations, plaintiffs did 
not.68  Rejecting this argument, the Court held that the 
“alleged injury—the loss of valuable liens—[was] the direct 
result of petitioners’ fraud [because] . . . . [i]t was a 
foreseeable and natural consequence of petitioners’ scheme to 
obtain more liens for themselves that other bidders would 
obtain fewer liens.”69   
 
                                              
64 Id. at 11. 
65 Id.  
66 553 U.S. 639, 657-58 (2008). 
67 See id. at 642.  
68 See id. at 653. 
69 Id. at 658.   
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 Keeping in mind that at the motion-to-dismiss stage 
we must accept all plausible allegations in the complaint as 
true, we view the case before us as more akin to Bridge than 
to Holmes, Anza, or Hemi.  The Court in Holmes, Anza, and 
Hemi was concerned that the conduct causing plaintiffs’ 
injuries was different than the conduct allegedly constituting 
a RICO violation.70  Each of those cases featured plaintiffs 
alleging harm that was derivative of harm suffered by a more 
immediate victim of the RICO activity.  Here, GSK focuses 
on the presence of intermediaries—physicians and patients—
in the causal chain.  But GSK does not argue that a doctor’s 
decision to prescribe Avandia or a patient’s decision to take 
Avandia caused plaintiffs’ injuries.  The conduct that 
allegedly caused plaintiffs’ injuries is the same conduct 
                                              
70 See, e.g., Holmes, 503 U.S. at 272 (“[T]he link is too 
remote between the stock manipulation alleged and the 
customers’ harm, being purely contingent on the harm 
suffered by the broker-dealers . . ..  The broker-dealers simply 
cannot pay their bills, and only that intervening insolvency 
connects the conspirators’ acts to the losses suffered by the 
nonpurchasing customers and general creditors.”); Anza, 547 
U.S. at 458 (“Ideal asserts it suffered its own harms when the 
Anzas failed to charge customers for the applicable sales tax.  
The cause of Ideal’s asserted harms, however, is a set of 
actions (offering lower prices) entirely distinct from the 
alleged RICO violation (defrauding the State).”); Hemi, 559 
U.S. at 11 (“[T]he conduct directly responsible for the City’s 
harm was the customers’ failure to pay their taxes.  And the 
conduct constituting the alleged fraud was Hemi’s failure to 
file Jenkins Act reports.  Thus, as in Anza, the conduct 
directly causing the harm was distinct from the conduct 
giving rise to the fraud.”). 
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forming the basis of the RICO scheme  alleged in the 
complaint – the misrepresentation of the heart-related risks of 
taking Avandia that caused TPPs and PBMs to place Avandia 
in the formulary.  The injury alleged by the TPPs is an 
economic injury independent of any physical injury suffered 
by Avandia users.71  And, as far as we can tell, prescribing 
physicians did not suffer RICO injury from GSK’s marketing 
of Avandia.    
 
 Nor should there be difficulty in distinguishing 
between the amount of damages attributable to a defendant’s 
violation and to other, independent factors.  The amount of 
damages is either the difference between what Avandia 
coverage cost and the cost of coverage of cheaper, safer drugs 
and/or the overvaluation of Avandia caused by GSK’s 
misrepresentations.  This issue of damages, rather than 
demonstrating a lack of proximate causation, raises an issue 
of proof regarding the overall number of prescriptions (under 
the “quantity effect” theory) or amount of price inflation 
(under the “excess price” theory) attributable to GSK’s 
actions.  This is a question of damages and, more specifically, 
a question for another day. 
 
 GSK, however, claims that plaintiffs’ theory of 
causation—that TPPs relied on GSK’s misrepresentations 
when including Avandia on formularies—fails as a matter of 
law.  According to GSK, plaintiffs cannot establish causation 
                                              
71 See Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 531 (holding that TPPs had 
standing to assert antitrust claims because they suffered 
“direct and independent harm” as a result of paying 
supracompetitive prices for the defendant’s drug regardless of 
any injury suffered by the consumer plaintiffs).   
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because they continued to cover Avandia prescriptions after 
its safety risks were publicly exposed in May 2007.  But this 
argument is based on two faulty assumptions.  GSK first asks 
us to assume, in the absence of contrary allegations, that 
plaintiffs did not change their coverage of Avandia in 2007.72  
At this stage, however, we do not know that this is true.  
  
 In addition, GSK’s argument assumes that plaintiffs 
knew the full scope of GSK’s alleged fraud based on the 
Nissen study.  Other TPPs, however, may have chosen to 
remove Avandia from their formularies in May 2007 simply 
out of an abundance of caution, not due to knowledge of 
Avandia’s full scope of risks.  In fact, GSK responded to the 
Nissen study with a marketing campaign, which plaintiffs 
allege was specifically designed to minimize the report’s 
effects on the medical community.  Furthermore, the FDA 
merely added black box warnings to Avandia in 2007 and did 
not restrict Avandia usage until September 2010, over three 
years after the Nissen study’s release.  Viewing these facts in 
the light most favorable to plaintiffs, we cannot conclude at 
this stage that Avandia’s cardiovascular risks were fully 
known in May 2007.   
 
 GSK further argues that plaintiffs’ claim, that doctors 
relied on GSK’s misrepresentations when prescribing 
Avandia, fails because there are no allegations that alternative 
prescriptions would have been cheaper.  As a preliminary 
matter, plaintiffs’ injury is not entirely contingent on the 
                                              
72 See Oral Arg. Tr. at 9:19-10:2 (“There’s no allegation in 
the complaint [Plaintiffs] changed any behavior [in 2007].  
And so I think the Court should assume that no change in 
behavior occurred.”).  
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existence of cheaper alternative drugs.  Although these 
allegations are central to plaintiffs’ “quantity effect” theory, 
they are less important to an “excess price” theory.  Under 
that theory, plaintiffs may be able to show that Avandia cost 
too much regardless of whether cheaper drugs existed on the 
market.   
 
 In any event, plaintiffs identify metformin as a cheaper 
alternative drug, which they allege was the most prevalent 
oral drug therapy for Type II diabetes prior to Avandia and 
cost substantially less than Avandia.  Despite GSK’s 
contention, it was not necessary for plaintiffs to have included 
a price comparison between Avandia and Actos, another Type 
II diabetes drug.  Although metformin may belong to an older 
class of drugs, it is not entirely clear when -- or even if -- 
Actos was a more popular alternative to Avandia than 
metformin.  Again, GSK seeks a dismissal as a matter of law 
when there is a factual dispute between plaintiffs and GSK on 
the existence of alternative therapies.  It is sufficient that a 
plaintiff identify in the pleadings a specific alternative drug 
that doctors would have prescribed and that would have cost 
less.   
 
 Finally, GSK argues that the presence of 
intermediaries, doctors and patients, destroys proximate 
causation because they were the ones who ultimately decided 
whether to rely on GSK’s misrepresentations.   But Bridge 
precludes that argument.  The plaintiffs in Bridge were the 
“primary and intended victims of the scheme to defraud” and 
their injury was a “foreseeable and natural consequence of 
[the] scheme,” regardless of whether they relied on the 
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misrepresentations.73  The same is true here.  Plaintiffs allege 
that drug manufacturers are well aware that TPPs cover the 
cost of their drugs and describe the alleged RICO scheme as 
consisting of “deliberately misrepresenting the safety of 
Avandia so that Plaintiff and members of the Class paid for 
this drug.”74  This fraudulent scheme could have been 
successful only if plaintiffs paid for Avandia, and this is the 
very injury that plaintiffs seek recovery for.  We conclude 
therefore that plaintiffs’ alleged injury is sufficiently direct to 
satisfy the RICO proximate cause requirement at this stage.75 
  
 Nor does this decision conflict with our holding in 
Steamfitters Local Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Philip 
Morris, Inc.76  There, we held that proximate causation was 
lacking where TPPs sued cigarette manufacturers based on 
alleged misrepresentations and sought damages for the money 
spent treating beneficiaries’ smoking-related health 
conditions.77  Analogizing to Holmes, we concluded that the 
smokers, like the broker-dealers there, were the “third party 
linking the plaintiffs and defendants.”78  In both cases, 
plaintiffs only “suffered a loss because of the harm that the 
defendants brought upon th[at] third party.”79  That is not 
                                              
73 See 553 U.S. at 650, 658. 
74 J.A.120, ¶ 184 (Allied Services Compl.); J.A.193, ¶ 178 
(UFCW Local 1776 Compl.); J.A.265, ¶ 235 (United Benefit 
Compl.). 
75 See Neurontin, 712 F.3d at 37-38.   
76 171 F.3d 912 (3d Cir. 1999). 
77 Id. at 930.  
78 Id. at 932. 
79 Id.     
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what happened here.  Although GSK identifies third parties, 
doctors and patients, within the causal chain, plaintiffs did not 
suffer economic harm because those third parties were 
injured.   
 To sum up, this case does not present any of the three 
fundamental causation concerns expressed in Holmes.  At 
least for the purposes of this motion to dismiss, the injury is 
sufficiently direct.  There is no risk of duplicative recovery 
here.  And, no one is better suited to sue GSK for its alleged 
fraud.80  At this stage in the litigation, plaintiffs “need only 
put forth allegations that raise a reasonable expectation that 
discovery will reveal evidence” of proximate causation.81  
They have done that here.   
 
IV. 
 Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged the elements of RICO 
standing, and GSK has not offered a valid justification for 
limiting the claims at this stage of the litigation.  While many 
of these issues will resurface in the future, we will not opine 
on the likelihood of plaintiffs’ success down the road.  We 
simply hold that it would be premature to dismiss plaintiffs’ 
well-pled RICO allegations at this juncture.  Accordingly, we 
will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
                                              
80 See Bridge, 553 U.S. at 658. 
81 See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 213 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (internal quotations omitted). 
